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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ANY WAY YOU SLICE IT: WHY RACIAL PROFILING IS WRONG

REGINALD T. SHUFORD*

INTRODUCTION
It has been said that in life but two things are certain: death and taxes.1 If
you are a young African-American or Latino male, however, there is an
additional certainty: At some point during your lifetime, you will be harassed
by the police.2 Racially motivated police harassment, vis-a-vis racial profiling,
is as American as baseball and apple pie. And it has been around, in some
form or fashion, for most of America’s history.3 Racial profiling happens to
consumers and pedestrians, on planes, trains, and automobiles. There is
driving while black (or brown), flying while black, walking while black,
shopping while black, hailing (as in a cab) while black, swimming while black
(six African-American youths accused of stealing a cell phone and beeper at a
public pool in Michigan) and dining while black (think Miami, where a tip was
automatically added to the bill of a black patron, on the assumption that blacks
are poor tippers), to name a few. The most accurate term to describe the
pervasiveness of the phenomenon is breathing while black, a reality
underscored by the shooting deaths over a thirteen-month period - by the New

* Staff Attorney, Legal Department, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation National
Headquarters, New York. I thank my ACLU colleagues around the country for their trailblazing
and inspiring work challenging racial profiling. I also want to thank my colleagues in my office
in New York for their enthusiastic support of my own work seeking an end to racial profiling.
1. Benjamin Franklin, JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A
COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT
AND MODERN LITERATURE (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
2. See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR,
BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARRASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 34 (1998)
“The frequency of contact between Black men and the police has led a generation of Black men
to teach their sons ‘The Lesson’ – instructions on how to handle a police stop.” Id.
3. For example, during the time of the Black Codes following the Civil War, among other
things, Blacks were stopped during their travels, forced to identify themselves and reveal where
they were coming from and where they were going. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAW 84-85. See also F.M. Baker, “Some Reflections on Racial Profiling,” 27 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 627 (1999) “Racial profiling is . . . a component of our national
fabric.” Id.
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York Police Department alone - of four unarmed black men, Amadou Diallo,
Patrick Dorismond, Malcolm Ferguson and Richard Watson.4
ARGUMENT
Any way you slice it, racial profiling is wrong.5 First, it is morally
indefensible, steeped as it is in racial stereotypes and erroneous assumptions
about the propensity of black and Latino men to commit particular types of
crimes.6 Second, racial profiling - equating race with criminality and using it
in the absence of and in lieu of probable cause - is legally impermissible.7 It
violates various constitutional and statutory rights, including the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, racial profiling is just bad,
ineffective policing. By targeting black and Latino men, practitioners of racial

4. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Breathing While Black, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A29; see
also Rocco Parascandola, Jamie Schram, Maria Malave & Tracy Connor, Unarmed Man Slain in
Police Struggle: Giuliani Asks Calm as Cops Start Probe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at A11;
Tina Kelley, Police Shooting Victim Is Remembered and Mourned in Tears and Songs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at B4.
5. See Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp.2d 780, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
“Racial profiling of any kind is anathema to our criminal justice system because it eviscerates the
core integrity that is necessary to operate that system effectively in our diverse democracy.” Id.
6. Racial profiling has flourished in the era of the War on Drugs. See generally Driving
While Black: Racial Profiling on our Nation’s Highways, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
SPECIAL REPORT, May 1999, available at http:www.aclu.org/profiling/rport/index.html. Where
abusive and excessive police practices were once conducted on the sly, the War on Drugs has
virtually sanctioned the public, systematic, and unapologetic violation of civil liberties. Add to
this a society still struggling with stereotypes involving race and crime, and the inevitable result is
that people of color are those bearing the brunt of these abusive practices. But see ELLIS COSE,
THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 107 (1993) (asserting that history teaches that racism and
stereotypes preceded a black underclass who commit a disproportionate amount of crime, thereby
undermining the argument that race-based law enforcement is merely a reaction to that reality).
7. For the first time, in 1999, the term “racial profiling” made its way into the dictionary.
The OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE defines “racial profiling” as the
“[a]lleged police policy of stopping and searching vehicles driven by people from particular racial
groups.” With appropriate respect, this author disagrees with this definition, because, as discussed
above, racial profiling occurs in non-vehicular contexts as well. The OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY’s definition of “racial profiling” is a more appropriate definition for “driving while
black” or “d.w.b.,” which also made the dictionary for the first time in 1999. RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY defines “d.w.b.” as: “Driving While Black (used ironically to
refer to the stoppage of a black motorist by police because of the motorist’s race rather than for
any real offense).”
Other commentators also have offered a definition of “racial profiling.” For example,
Harvard Law School Professor Randall Kennedy urges a broad definition of racial profiling,
consistent with present-day police practices: “using race as a factor [not the sole factor] in
deciding whom to place under suspicion and/or surveillance.” Randall Kennedy, Suspect, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13 & 20, 1999, at 35 (emphasis added).
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profiling ignore the reality that others are committing crimes (especially those
involving the transport of drugs on the nation’s highways) and are largely
being allowed to get away with it. Additionally, the societal costs exacted by
racial profiling, including jury nullification and the lack of faith in the justice
system, are immeasurable.
DISCUSSION
The Immorality of Racial Profiling
Racial profiling is morally indefensible. Under the guise of good policing,
racial profilers stereotype and penalize African-Americans and Latinos solely
on the basis of their skin color.8 Even conceding that, as with all races, some
small percentage of African-Americans and Latinos are committing crimes,
racially motivated policing punishes everyone for the sins of a few.9 So
widespread is racial profiling that Harvard Law School Professor Randall
Kennedy, in his book Race, Crime, and the Law, likens it to a tax levied
against black men: “[A] young black man selected for questioning by police as
he alights from an airplane or drives a car is being made to pay a type of racial
tax for the war against drugs that whites and other groups escape.”10
In attempting to justify racial profiling, its proponents frequently demonize
people of color, often employing hateful and vitriolic rhetoric. Last year, for
example, New Jersey State Police Superintendent Carl Williams said to a
newspaper that “mostly minorities” traffic in marijuana and cocaine and that
“[t]he president of the United States went to Mexico to talk to the president of
Mexico about drugs. He didn’t go to Ireland. He didn’t go to England.”11
Fortunately for motorists of color traveling the roads of New Jersey, he was
fired soon thereafter.12
In another example, white separatist Jared Taylor told an annual meeting
of the National Association of Police Organizations that law-enforcement
officers were justified in using racial profiling during police traffic stops.13

8. Many consider the case of Wen Ho Lee, the Chinese scientist accused and incarcerated
for spying, as an example of racial profiling indicating that Asian-Americans are victims of the
practice as well.
9. See COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVLEDGED CLASS, supra note 6, at 94-95 (pointing out that,
in the context of violent crimes, blacks who are arrested made up less that 1 percent of the black
population in 1991, and just under 1.7% of the black male population).
10. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 159.
11. Joe Donohoe, Trooper Boss: Race Plays Role in Drug Crimes, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
Feb. 28, 1999.
12. Corky Siemaszko, N.J. Top Cop Axed for Race Remarks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1,
1999.
13. See ACLU Newswire: White Separatist Defends Racial Profiling At Police Meeting,
Aug. 20, 1999, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/w082099a.html.
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Taylor, who has called diversity “unnatural” and said on his Web site that
whites face “the prospect of oblivion,” said that profiling was “common sense”
because blacks commit violent crimes more than whites.14 Likewise, Marshall
Frank, a retired police officer defended racial profiling by resorting to racist
and inaccurate assumptions about the make of cars people drove, the type of
clothes they wore, and the neighborhoods they visited.15 In the editorial,
Frank, referring to people as “dirt-bags,” said, “Label me a racist if you
wish.”16 He displayed no concern whatever about condemnation for his racist
beliefs. One can only imagine the lessons he passed on to the officers in his
charge during his thirty years as an officer. Even more frightening is the
untold number of motorists who likely fell victim to his shameless beliefs.
Those sentiments, thankfully, are at great odds with what most Americans
believe today.17
Another factor illustrating the morally shallow ground upon which racial
profiling rests is the all-too-common failure of its proponents seriously to
appreciate or care about the deleterious effects racial profiling has on its
victims. Motorists penalized for driving while black or brown will, at the very
least, be inconvenienced. Frequently, the experience will be frightening,
humiliating or even traumatic. Sometimes, the episode will be deadly.18 The
shooting of three African-American and Latino youths on the New Jersey
Turnpike by New Jersey State Troopers in 1998 demonstrates that the lives of
young black and Latino men mean little or nothing to officers who have sworn
an oath to protect everyone.19 Yet, the Marshall Franks of the world justify
racial profiling on the ground that it is “better to be safe than sorry.” Such

14. Id.
15. Marshall Frank, Otherviews, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 1999 (op/ed.).
16. Id.
17. In a Gallup poll, the general public indicated its overwhelming disapproval of the
practice of racial profiling. According to the poll, 59 percent of all Americans, 56 percent of
white Americans, and 77 percent of African-Americans said that racial profiling is widespread.
Moreover, 81 percent of all Americans disapprove of racial profiling. Over 40 percent of AfricanAmericans say they have been the victims of racial profiling, including 72 percent of AfricanAmerican men aged 18-34. Unsurprisingly, African-Americans are more likely to have a
negative view of police than their white counterparts. See Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is
Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9,
1999, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991209.asp. Demonstrating the extent
to which racial profiling has become a part of daily discourse, even “Dear Abby” repudiated the
practice. See Abigail Van Buren, Dear Abby, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 2000, at B14, available at
http://www.newsday.com/coverage/current/fanfare/Monday/nd1067.htm.
18. Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond in New York, Jonny Gammage in Pennsylvania,
and Tyisha Miller in California, presumed dangerous before being gunned down, all died from
racial profiling.
19. See Peter Noel, Fear and Loathing on the New Jersey Turnpike, THE VILLAGE VOICE,
June 4, 1998.
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callous disregard for the safety and well-being of profiling victims begs an
obvious question: safer for whom?
The Illegality of Racial Profiling
Beyond being immoral, racial profiling is also illegal.20 The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids unequal treatment on
the basis of race.21 “The central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.”22
The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.”23 Racial profiling, which targets
people of color on the basis of nothing more than their race and subjects them
to differential treatment, stands in direct contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s mandates.
There are several ways for a plaintiff to plead intentional race
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause: a plaintiff could
point to a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the basis of race;24
20. Race as the sole factor in law enforcement activity is impermissible. See, e.g. United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (prohibiting use of Mexican ancestry as basis for
Terry stop); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equal Protection clause is
violated when a police officer initially targets someone solely on basis of race, without additional
factors, and then, because of the person’s race, investigates that person for drug trafficking.);
Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 991 F.Supp. 895, 901-02 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (“There can be no question that a seizure based solely on race or ethnicity can never
be reasonable.”); Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F.Supp. 487, 499 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (“[A] search or
seizure will never be considered reasonable if the officer stops the vehicle solely because of the
mexican ancestry of the occupant.”) (emphases in original); United States v. Ramos, 753 F.Supp.
75, 78-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (Hispanic appearance insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to
justify a stop.); Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F.Supp. 1278, 1283 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (A seizure can
never be reasonable if the stop was based solely on person’s Mexican ancestry.). However, the
use of race as one of several factors is not proscribed. See e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873;
Avery, 137 F.3d 343. But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6494
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Border Patrol may not rely on Hispanic ancestry as a factor in
making stops and overruling prior cases in which Hispanic appearance was permitted to serve as a
basis for stops, absent particularized or individualized suspicion).
21. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
22. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995) (quoting Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
Accord McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Lowery v. Commonwealth of Virginia
388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. App. 1990). See also Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 932 (5th
Cir. 1991). “The heart of the equal protection clause is its prohibition of discriminatory
treatment. If a governmental actor has imposed unequal burdens based upon race, it has violated
the clause.” Id.
23. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227-229.
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a plaintiff could identify a facially neutral policy that has been applied in an
intentionally discriminatory manner;25 or a plaintiff could allege that a facially
neutral statute or policy has an adverse effect and that it was motivated by
Racial profiling cases are likely to contain
discriminatory animus.26
allegations of an express racial classification.27
Racial profiling also violates the Fourth Amendment, which is designed to
protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.28 In the context
of vehicular stops, an investigative stop of an automobile “must be justified by
some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity.”29 In other words, some level of reasonable
suspicion is required. The law enforcement officer conducting the stop must be
able to “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant” stopping a person to
conduct further investigation.30 For automobile searches, while a warrant is
not required, probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband is still
a prerequisite.31 “Probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found.’”32 In the absence of probable cause, a
search warrant, or exigent circumstances, a search will be deemed legal only if
it is conducted with the consent of the party searched.33

25. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
26. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65; see generally Brown v. Oneonta, 195
F.3d 111, 118-119 (2d Cir. 1999).
27. See, e.g., Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches, et al. v. Maryland Dep’t of
State Police, et al., 72 F.Supp.2d 560, 568-69 (D.Md. 1999); Chavez v. Illinois, 27 F.Supp.2d
1053, 1070 (N.D.Ill. 1998); Gerald v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Public Serv., CIV-99-676-R (W.D.
Okla. Dec. 21, 1999) (slip op. at 21) (on file with the author); National Congress for Puerto Rican
Rights v. City of New York, et al., 191 F.R.D. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
28. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .” U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); accord Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d
1237 (9th Cir. 2000).
30. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
31. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); accord Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
659 (1979) (Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred). Unfortunately, protections accorded motorists are not always
extensive. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (granting police broad authority to
search driver and passengers, vehicle, compartments and containers, incident to lawful custodial
arrest); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is “free to go” before his consent to
search will be recognized as voluntary).
32. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983)).
33. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). The government has the “burden of
proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a
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Depending upon the nature and severity of the encounter, allegations
generally will be that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping a
motorist of color without reasonable suspicion, searching him and his vehicle
without probable cause, detaining him for unreasonably long periods of time,
coercing consent to search or searching without consent, and deploying a drugsniffing dog for an intrusive and unjustified search.34
Claims also may exist under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
its implementing regulations, which prohibit discrimination by agencies
receiving federal funding.35 Significantly, while Title VI itself bars only
intentional discrimination, its implementing regulations also prohibit practices
that have an unjustified disparate impact.36
Although claims based upon the constitutional right to travel have yet to
meet with much success in racial profiling cases,37 under the right
circumstances, a racial profiling litigant may prevail.38 Moreover, depending
upon the factual circumstances surrounding the profiling incident, various
torts, including false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress, also may be alleged, as well as
conspiracy and state statutory claims.39

burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. See
also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Maryland State Conference, 72 F.Supp.2d at 560.
35. Title VI provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. §2000d. Department of Justice implementing regulations provide that no funding
recipient shall:
utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the
effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the
program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2).
36. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardian Ass’n v. Civil Service
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 607-08, 612, 634 (1983); Rodriguez v. California
Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp.2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
37. E.g., Maryland State Conference, 72 F.Supp.2d at 568-69; Chavez, 27 F.Supp.2d at 1070
(N.D.Ill. 1998); Gerald, CIV-99-676-R, slip op. at 21.
38. See generally Maryland State Conference, 72 F.Supp.2d at 568-69. Concluding that the
plaintiffs’ assertion that they continued to use Maryland’s highways indicated the absence of an
“actual barrier,” the court held that “more” of an impediment than the stops alleged by plaintiffs
was required to establish a constitutional violation. Id. In some circumstances, therefore, it is
conceivable that “more” can be shown and a right to travel violation accordingly established.
39. See, e.g., Complaint, Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp.2d 1131, No. C-99-20895-JF/EAI (Nov. 30,
1999) (on file with author). See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986.
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The Inefficiency of Racial Profiling
In addition to being immoral and illegal, racial profiling is bad policing,
failing to reduce crime - some say even breeding it - and exacting
immeasurable costs upon society. Time and again, studies have shown that
racial profiling, to combat crime generally and in service of the War on Drugs,
in particular, is simply ineffective. For example, federal statistics show that
African-Americans are 13 percent of the country’s drug users (equivalent to
their composition in the American population), yet African-Americans
constitute 37 percent of those arrested on drug charges, 55 percent of those
convicted on drug charges, and 74 percent of all drug offenders sentenced to
prison.40 The former Attorney General of New Jersey has called this
phenomenon the “perverse illogic” of racial profiling: when people of color are
targeted and searched at a grossly disproportionate rate, it is only logical that
they will be arrested and incarcerated at a commensurately high rate.41
Meanwhile, the 87 percent of drug users who are NOT African-American are
for the most part left alone.
In Maryland, statistics by the Maryland State Police show that black and
white motorists were found to have drugs at an equal rate of 28 percent,42 and
that blacks were 73 percent of those stopped and searched, despite being only
17.5 percent of those committing traffic violations.43

40. See Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Army War, in CRACK IN AMERICA
262-68 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997). Accord 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATUSTICS (U.S. Department of Justice and State University of New York at
Albany); RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 31 (Despite being 38 percent of all crack users, blacks
account for more than 85 percent of federal crack convictions.) See also Jennifer Loven, Black
Women Stopped Disproportionately By Customs, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2000,
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/travel/DailyNews/blackwomen000410.html
(indicating that while black women passing through U.S. Customs as they return home from
overseas trips are more likely to be subjected to strip searches and X-rays, they are the least likely
to be carrying drugs).
41. Final Report of the State Police Review Team, July 2, 1999, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/Rpt_ii.pdf. Accord Martinez, 92 F. Supp.2d at 783. “[T]argeting
Blacks for police surveillance results in higher rates of arrest, reinforcing the presumption of
Black criminality. If police stopped and frisked whites as frequently as they do Blacks, white
arrest rates would increase.” Id. (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and
the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775
(1999)). “Put simply, there is a connection between where police look for contraband and where
they find it.” Id. (quoting David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why
“Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 301 (1999)).
42. This number seems extremely high and is probably being overstated by the Maryland
State Police in an attempt to show the effectiveness of its tactics. Its significance, however, is
obvious: it is the same across races.
43. Driving While Black, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 32.
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Not only does racial profiling fail miserably in an arguably wellintentioned but poorly executed effort to rid America of drugs, its societal costs
are extraordinary.44 For one thing, people of color “individually and as a
community are psychologically harmed.”45 The costs to society also include
the perpetuation of inaccurate stereotypes, which in turn produces
“exaggerated levels of fear and more pronounced levels of scapegoating.”46
Fundamentally,
[r]ace-based policies pit law enforcement against minorities and create an
unbreakable cycle: racial stereotypes may motivate police to arrest Blacks
more frequently. This in turn generates statistically disparate arrest patterns,
which in turn form the basis for further police selectivity by race.47

Racial profiling also results in the refusal by some people of color to
cooperate with police investigations, to disbelieve police officers who are
testifying against a criminal defendant and to employ jury nullification when
serving on juries.48 According to Professor David Cole, racially discriminatory
law enforcement practices
undermine law enforcement itself, because they breed resentment and
alienation among minorities . . . . People who see the criminal justice system
as fundamentally unfair will be less likely to cooperate with police, to testify as
witnesses, to serve on juries, and to convict guilty defendants when they do

44. See generally id. at 36-7.
45. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 44. “The impact of police harassment is cumulative. Each
negative experience creates another building block in the Black folklore about police.” Id.
Accord Harris, supra note 40, at 268. “Pretextual traffic stops aggravate years of accumulated
feelings of injustice, resulting in deepening distrust and cynicism by African-Americans about
police and the entire criminal justice system.” Id.
46. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 45. See also COSE, supra note 6, at 110. “[A]s long as the
dominant message sent to impressionable black boys is that they are expected to turn into savage
criminals, nothing will stop substantial numbers of them from doing just that.” Id.
47. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 45. The costs to society also can be measured in monetary
terms:
U.S. taxpayers have paid tens of millions of dollars in police brutality suits. Between
1992 and 1993, Los Angeles County alone paid more than $30 million to citizens
victimized by police brutality. In 1996, an all-white Indianapolis jury held the city liable
for the police killing of an unarmed 16-year-old Black boy. The jury awarded $4.3
million.
Id. In New York, there is a similar patter of payouts. See Kevin Flynn, Record Payout In
Settlements Against Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at B1; Michael Cooper, Stricter Oversight
of Police Would Save Money, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, at B3. The cases of Abner Louima and
Amadou Diallo are likely to produce substantial settlement payouts, as well.
48. See id. at 46. For a discussion of jury nullification and its various manifestations, see
Jack Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury Nullification, 81 JUDICATURE 168; see also Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE
L.J. 677 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullification,
32 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 285 (1999).
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serve. In addition, people who have lost respect for the law’s legitimacy are
more likely to break the law themselves. . . . Finally, the perception and reality
of a fundamentally unfair criminal justice system contribute to broader racial
divisions in society.49

Even judges, finding racial profiling at play, have suppressed evidence,
reduced sentences or refused to convict in criminal cases.50
CONCLUSION
Racial profiling “operate[s] like a deadly cancer on our justice system.”51
It eats away at the very liberties which have made America the greatest country
in the world: “the freedom to go about our business without unwarranted
police interference and the right to be treated equally before the law, without
regard to race or ethnicity.”52 Law enforcement agencies expend limited
resources unsuccessfully targeting black and Latino citizens in their failed
efforts carrying out the War on Drugs. In so doing, racial profilers trample
upon the civil, constitutional and human rights of people of color, most often
without apology and increasingly with tragic consequences. Those who are
targeted, part of the largest growing segments of the American population, in
turn regard police officers and the justice system, generally, with suspicion and
skepticism. Some go so far as to resist helping a police investigation; some
will even nullify verdicts. To most Americans, the Civil Rights Movement, led
by Martin Luther King, Jr., signified a sea of change in the fight for racial
equality. Dr. King’s philosophy exalted nonviolence and brotherhood over
hate and brute force and called for the equal treatment of all Americans. Dr.
King ‘s plea was simple: that all individuals be judged by the content of their
Racial profiling is
character rather than the color of their skin.53
incontrovertible evidence that we are not yet there.

49. Martinez, 92 F. Supp.2d at 782 (quoting David Cole, Race, Policing, and the Future of
Criminal Law, 26 HUM. RTS. 3 (Summer 1999)).
50. See, e.g., U.S. v. Laymon, 730 F.Supp. 332 (D.Colo. 1990); United States v. Leviner, 31
F.Supp.2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998); State v. Soto # 88-07-492 Superior Court of New Jersey
(L.Div. March 4, 1996, Judge Francis) (on file with author); United States v. Williams, No. CR93-214-A, slip op. (W.D. Okla. January 11, 1994) (on file with author).
51. Martinez, 92 F. Supp.2d at 783.
52. Driving While Black, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 7.
53. See STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 254 (1982) (“I Have A Dream” speech).

